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--See exchange with Blight, Sept./Oct 1987, on Ellsberg revelation: Cuban takeover of SAM site. (Harvard vetoes my appearance; I, enraged, arrange op-ed, Tufts seminar?...

 Their skepticism: no one else knows about this. SI! (did exist; and Hersh confirms interpretation)

 I was wrong! BUT: crucial inference: K did not order shootdown, and was appalled by it. (See Sergei K's comment, on loss of control: in Cooke).

 Also: (none of us knew at the time, 1987: when did it come out?) SI did refer to a serious incident: tac nucs were in Cuba, they were being moved to threaten Guantanamo (!) and an accident with them, with casualties, did occur, shown on SI.

 Again, K's now-confirmed fear of loss of control referred as well to these!

So it was FEAR by K—not JFK's private concession, or his willingness to make public concession (just revealed on Aug. 27, before Blight's proposal to me, and revealed at Hawk's Bay in March 87 by Rusk)—that led to K's "agreement" to remove missiles. (Hyp: given shootdown of U-2, K would have removed missiles even without JFK's "promise" (rescinded) not to invade Cuba, let alone without private concession on Turkey.

Yet: though both K and JFK were fearful of loss of control, and didn't want war, they postponed concessions sufficient to avoid war while actually risking loss of control, which might well have occurred. Their concern didn't guarantee no war, which "almost" occurred (if, say, Castro's gunners had downed a plane on Saturday, or Sunday morning before K's speech).

--File: Deterrence (Type II) (but even Type I: LOW) based on threat of loss of control : unauthorized action, (or, threat of delegation, to commanders who don't act "rationally" with respect to national strategic interests, or wrt long-term concerns (environment, "collateral damage" to allies and neutrals, recovery, species): who act on rules, impulse, "emotion," revenge, "Let the heavens fall" (let the species become extinct: better extinct than red: Goebel's wife)

 C-2, NATO, P-II, "existential deterrence" (unpack this); Taiwan Straits (delegation, attitude of PACAF, etc.)

--HISTORIOGRAPHY OF C-II

 What people didn't know, at various times;
 Why they didn't know it;
 How this affected their interpretations

e.g. SU warheads, tac nucs, delegation, Castro decision to fire, no K order to fire SAM; AND incident at Los Banes (?) SAM site, accident, SI on casualties (what if they had known this, as I did, in 87, and didn't know it was misinterpreted by NSA?); RFK double ultimatum; nucs on SU subs; safety problems...Cordier ploy; (earlier, private offer on Turkey); MONGOOSE; NORTHWOODS; ASSASS. ATTEMPTS; PSALM

Selective willingness to take evidence seriously (that makes X look bad, or good: JFK, K, ...; or makes prob of war look high, or low...

[TCS and Neustadt et al say, "But you're the only one who knows of this!" That WAS true of the SI on accident; but it could have been ANY of the above! Rusk had just revealed something of which HE was the only one who knew.]

When did anyone besides me conjecture that K had not ordered the SAM shootdown (which I inferred from SI plus other allegations)? (I told Paul Jacobs in 1976; did others believe it at Harvard in 1987, aside from my assertions?)

When did these people learn about Mongoose? It doesn't come out (for me or public) until Branch and Crile in 1975-76 and Church Committee 1975-76.

Is it in the March 1987 discussions or the August 87 at Harvard or the 1992 Moscow? It was NOT in RFK's memoir, 13 Days, 1969 (edited by Sorensen: did he know at the time? Did Schlesinger? Not in their histories). Is it in Allison's study? (RAND 1970?)

This turns the crisis on its head! In terms of US provocation (see also Northwoods, and invasion plans). And in terms of the ability of the whole (not wholly cleared) ExComm to judge SU motives, or possible reactions (e.g., to assurance of no invasion!); hence, reliance of cleared members—esp. the president—on their advice, what their actual role was!

(JFK had to run the crisis on his own understanding, which he couldn't share with his "advisors"—see my talk with HAK about special clearances (PSALM, Mongoose, invasion plans, assass. Plans...) not only without real advice from ExComm (as a whole) but while fooling them (too, along with public) about what he knows and what he plans to do, indicating to them (especially JCS) that he has an entirely different plan in mind, different bottom line...)

(which increases the risks: he has to **postpone** his willingness to trade—and to try an ultimatum (as well as a private trade)—(without knowing—K's secret!—that K isn't in control of the action JFK is trying to deter with a threat: AA fire; or even, SAMs! Or nucs, which JFK doesn't even know need to be deterred!) while risks are being run.

Same for K: he can't concede too fast, in face of generals who are concerned about the opinion of Albania! On Saturday morning, **he** makes a "last effort" to get a good outcome, by accepting JFK's private proposal through RFK Friday night of a trade. (Given RFK, K has good reason to expect that JFK will accept this "reasonable offer" as JFK wants to do Saturday morning: but he's argued out of it by McG and others. But Castro could have shot down US planes on Saturday afternoon! (Almost

did). (JFK could still have held off attack one more day, until he had tried his public/private offer and ultimatums.)

EMPIRE

[See Ronald Steel review of Mead, *Mortal Splendor*: "It makes little sense to be an empire and to deny it.

Does it?

This is the function of : Secrecy; covert actions (CIA) (What is relation of MI-6 to British Empire?); NUCLEAR POLICY (NOT for the overt, "declaratory policy" of deterring nuclear attack on US or "closest allies," OR for deterring overwhelming attack on our closest, First World, trading partners, West Europe (BUT in their case, keeping them in a close alliance with us, preventing their being trading partners with the East (as, Japan with China) (or having socialist, economic nationalist regimes, less coop with our corps; an alliance AGAINST East; Germany divided: exaggerating (and building) a threat from the East, requiring US crucial role in West; rebuilding (by rearming!) West Germany (even at the cost of an armed East Germany, and Soviet divisions in East Germany, on border of West, to hold onto East Germany);

If "limiting damage in nuclear war" was a real objective, nothing could serve it so much as holding down (if not eliminating) Soviet capability against the US (or Europe)! At cost of holding down our own threat to SU? Why not?

No, we must strive to **limit damage to the US in a US first strike against the SU**. Why must the latter be contemplated? For above objectives, and to deter SU second-strike in response to US FU against a Soviet ally outside Europe. Won't this compel SU to develop a second-strike force buildup? Fine—so long as we maintain our threat of FS and FU, by pursuing superiority (good for MIC and USAF).

(Oddly, the SU didn't really build up for twenty years; though it suited our MIC to pretend or fear that it had; it relied on minimum deterrence (vulnerable: dangerous) and conventional threat (in early years) and threat to Europe (inadequate deterrence to us!); then, went beyond deterrence to imitate the US (Paine says, in hopes of wielding extended deterrence themselves diplomatically : though I would say they didn't have the need that we felt we did).

Key point: We are an empire, and we act like an empire. Though as a democracy, it doesn't suit us to admit to our public that we do what empires do, the evil things. And it's not necessary, given secrecy, willingness to lie, willingness of officials to keep secrets and to obey.

Nothing is more evil than the new thing in which we have innovated as an empire: the threat and risk of extermination with nuclear weapons. (Unfortunately, "**collateral extermination**" of our allies, neutrals, even ourselves: that must be subjected to denial.

Compare DDT; or some rat poison, cockroach poison, that kills...But we're "only threatening." (This involves, however, a conscious—necessarily secret, denied, misdirected from—gamble: acceptance of higher risk of unilateral or mutual extermination than from other "options". (This is involved in the very practice of discussing nuclear war as an "option," in fact, multiple options. "I need alternative forms of extermination.")

(We are not "bluffing" to the extent of Khrushchev, who pretended to have weapons and capabilities that did not exist.) (Nor were there reliable locks on our weapons: we could not sincerely pretend to total control at the top, quite apart from presidential control of his own choices under internal pressure). (Same for Russians! And no doubt, other NWS.)

Ideological aspect of Cold War (CW): a basis for being willing to risk the destruction both of the enemy (annihilation) and of ourselves and others. We were not a "lesser evil" but a crusader...for God. (See Dang van sung) Like Magda Goebbels.

Willingness to exterminate. After practice of destroying cities in WWII. Seeing enemy as if "heathen," not subject to rules of Just War. (Hitler innovated in redefining "us" and "them: race, Jews as non-citizens (and sub-humans, rats, lice, vermin) and Slavs; and he abandoned rules that Christian monarchs had observed for other Christians—he treated other Europeans as Christians treated heathen, colonials treated natives. And we treated his people as he treated Warsaw, London; and **we treated both German and Japanese urban people as he treated Jews: killed as many as we could as fast as we could, speeding up as the war neared its end!** (many Americans wished war could have gone on longer so we could use more Bombs on Japanese).

--To expose or denounce our actually evil actions—our covert actions, the effects of our bombing...--is the ultimate tabu for an official, member of the Establishment, or the mainstream media.

Just as it tabu (really not done, unthinkable) to describe a policy once chosen by the president (or really, one he might well choose) as evil, criminal or immoral: at worst, "misguided, ill-chosen, not optimal, thoughtless, unpromising, even reckless (on the edge of tabu), " ill-advised, thoughtless, mistaken...

Actions and policies that are not easily described so euphemistically must be denied, hidden altogether (hence, covert): especially, the relation to them of the president, or of presidential (or other coherent but non-admirable) motives.

In general, anything that would imply "imperial" behavior is denied, unspoken.